Energy security, employment and the policy-industry interlock: explaining the role of multi-scalar socio-spatial embeddedness in industry destabilization by Sillak, Silver & Kanger, Laur
Energy Security, Employment and the Policy-
Industry Interlock: Explaining the Role of 
Multi-Scalar Socio-Spatial Embeddedness in 
Industry Destabilization
Silver Sillak and Laur Kanger
SWPS 2018-09 (March)
Guidelines for authors
Papers should be submitted to swps@sussex.ac.uk as a PDF or Word file. The first page
should include: title, abstract, keywords, and authors’ names and affiliations. The paper will
be considered for publication by an Associate Editor, who may ask two referees to provide a
light review. We aim to send referee reports within three weeks from submission. Authors
may be requested to submit a revised version of the paper with a reply to the referees’
comments to swps@sussex.ac.uk. The Editors make the final decision on the inclusion of the
paper in the series. When submitting, the authors should indicate if the paper has already
undergone peer-review (in other series, journals, or books), in which case the Editors may
decide to skip the review process. Once the paper is included in the SWPS, the authors
maintain the copyright.
Websites
UoS: www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/research/swps
SSRN: http://www.ssrn.com/link/SPRU-RES.html
IDEAS: ideas.repec.org/s/sru/ssewps.html
Research Gate: www.researchgate.net/journal/2057-6668_SPRU_Working_Paper_Series
Editors Contact
Tommaso Ciarli T.Ciarli@sussex.ac.uk
Daniele Rotolo D.Rotolo@sussex.ac.uk
Associate Editors Area
Karoline Rogge Energy K.Rogge@sussex.ac.uk
Paul Nightingale,
Ben Martin, &
Ohid Yaqub
Science, & Technology Policy P.Nightingale@sussex.ac.uk
B.Martin@sussex.ac.uk
O.Yaqub@sussex.ac.uk
Tommaso Ciarli Development T.Ciarli@sussex.ac.uk
Joe Tidd &
Carlos Sato
Technology Innovation Management J.Tidd@sussex.ac.uk
C.E.Y.Sato@sussex.ac.uk
Maria Savona Economics of Technological Change M.Savona@sussex.ac.uk
Andrew Stirling Transitions A.C.Stirling@sussex.ac.uk
Caitriona McLeish Civil Military Interface C.A.McLeish@sussex.ac.uk
Editorial Assistance
Martha Bloom M.Bloom@sussex.ac.uk
SPRU Working Paper Series (ISSN 2057-6668)
The SPRU Working Paper Series aims to accelerate the public availability of the research
undertaken by SPRU-associated people, and other research that is of considerable interest
within SPRU, providing access to early copies of SPRU research.
1 
 
Table of contents 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
2. Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Industry regime and industry destabilization ............................................................................ 4 
2.2. Socio-spatial embeddedness and multi-scalarity ...................................................................... 5 
2.3. Synthesis: industrial transformation as an interaction of embedding and disembedding 
mechanisms ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
3. Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 7 
3.1. Case selection ............................................................................................................................ 7 
3.2. Process-tracing .......................................................................................................................... 8 
4. Case study ...................................................................................................................................... 10 
4.1. Periodization ........................................................................................................................... 10 
4.2. The de- and re-stabilization of the Estonian oil shale industry regime (1995–2016) ............. 11 
4.2.1. Framing of the climate change issue and post-Soviet economic struggle (1995–2002) .. 11 
4.2.2. Joining the EU, “gold rush” and incremental innovation (2003–2009) ........................... 15 
4.2.3. State investments into oil shale and industry prosperity (2010–2013) ............................ 18 
4.2.4. Pressure alignment: oil price crisis and the Paris agreement (2014–2016) ..................... 19 
5. Analysis and discussion ................................................................................................................. 22 
6. Conclusion and policy implications ............................................................................................... 26 
7. References ...................................................................................................................................... 27 
Appendix A. Coding manual for the content analysis of newspaper articles. ................................... 30 
 
  
2 
 
Energy security, employment and the policy-industry interlock: explaining the 
role of multi-scalar socio-spatial embeddedness in industry destabilization1 
Silver Sillak, Laur Kanger 
 
Silver Sillak 
Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia 
Laur Kanger 
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, UK 
Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Abstract 
Existing literature on industry destabilization has relatively neglected the embeddedness of indus-
tries to their regional and national contexts. This might result in overestimating the potential for 
industry destabilization in specific localities. Combining the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) 
model and the geography of transitions literature this article analyses the developments in the Esto-
nian oil shale energy industry between 1995-2016. We show that the ties between the industry and 
its local context serve as an important stabilizing mechanism offsetting the destabilizing pressures 
as conceptualized by the DILC model. The cancelling out of two mechanisms on a local level leads 
to a misalignment of scales where the continued presence of global pressure of climate change is 
not matched by local dynamics. Hence in contrast to what the DILC model implies, there is no 
straightforward transmission of international pressures on local industries: instead this process is 
mediated through and likely heavily influenced by national and regional considerations. The find-
ings imply that for industry destabilization and energy transitions to occur, not only the regime but 
also its connections to the local context need to be destabilized and transformed. 
Keywords: energy transitions, industry destabilization, geography of transitions, socio-spatial  
embeddedness, multi-scalarity 
1. Introduction 
The destabilization of industries has recently gained attention in transitions literature (Penna and 
Geels, 2012, 2015; Karltorp and Sandén, 2012; Turnheim and Geels, 2012, 2013; Ottosson and 
Magnusson, 2013; Bosman et al., 2014; Geels and Penna, 2015; Kungl and Geels, 2017; Roberts, 
2017; Sovacool et al., 2017). This focus is timely given that current environmental issues 
necessitate a radical transformation of energy industries based on the centralized generation of 
electricity from fossil fuels. Indeed, a heavy fossil fuel lock-in of incumbent industries has been 
                                                 
1 This work has been presented at the IST2017 conference. We thank Piret Tõnurist, Teis Hansen and two anonymous 
reviewers of SWPS for their insightful comments on improving the paper. 
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identified as a major source of resistance to the broader transformation of current energy systems 
(Unruh, 2000; Unruh, 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Hence the focus of existing 
work on successful cases of industry destabilization which has led to the identification of different 
types of external pressures facing industry regimes (Geels, 2014a), impact of these pressures on the 
industry (Turnheim and Geels, 2012, 2013) as well as the basic patterns of industry destabilization 
(Penna and Geels, 2012). It has been demonstrated that industry reorientation emerges through a 
multi-dimensional struggle involving techno-economic and socio-political pressures of varying 
intensity, heterogeneous responses from industry players, temporary setbacks and reversals (Penna 
and Geels, 2015), and a range of outcomes from dissolution (Sovacool et al., 2017) to re-creation 
(Kungl and Geels, 2017). 
In some ways then the theorization of the industry destabilization process has been based on rather 
exceptional cases where notable shifts in industrial activities can be observed. Yet as the concepts 
like carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000; Unruh, 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006), path 
dependency (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000), entrapment (Walker, 2000) and technological 
momentum (Hughes, 1994) suggest, more often than not industries remain remarkably resilient to 
change. From the industry destabilization perspective this raises a challenge of dealing with cases in 
which the preconditions for large-scale industrial transformation seem to be present yet little of it 
actually occurs. This framing suggests a shift in attention from the mechanisms facilitating 
industrial change to the interaction of mechanisms facilitating and hindering it. 
This paper is based on the intuition, derived from recent advances in the geography of transitions 
(Coenen et al., 2012; Coenen and Truffer, 2012; Raven et al., 2012; Truffer and Coenen, 2012; 
Bridge et al., 2013; Hansen and Coenen, 2015; Murphy, 2015; Truffer et al., 2015; Becker et al., 
2016; Truffer, 2016; Haan, 2017), that the high degree of stability and lock-in of industries has 
much to do with the ways in which they are embedded to their local (that is, regional and national) 
contexts. However, so far the notion of embeddedness has largely remained a sensitizing heuristic in 
the transitions literature and has not been operationalized in empirical research on industry 
destabilization. As such neither the nature of different types of embeddedness on different spatial 
scales nor their interactions with destabilizing pressures are currently well understood. In this paper 
we seek to address this gap by combining the insights of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle Model 
(Penna and Geels, 2012) and the geography of transitions literature to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What are the main forms of socio-spatial embeddedness of industries on different 
geographical scales? 
2. How do global pressures interact with local embeddedness and what is the result of this 
interaction for industry destabilization? 
We explore these questions through a multi-method case study on the destabilization of the Estonian 
oil shale industry between 1995-2016. The case was selected because of Estonia’s globally unique 
reliance on oil shale as the primary source of energy. This has placed specific burdens on the 
Estonian energy regime such as the contribution of oil shale to Estonia’s ecological footprint, one of 
the largest (per capita) in Europe. (Global Footprint Network, 2017). Combined with increasing 
worries about climate change and the growing availability of renewables one would expect the 
Estonian industry to be on the path of major re-orientation. Yet in 2016 about 85% of electricity in 
Estonia still continued to be produced from oil shale. From the perspective of industry 
destabilization, Estonia thus constitutes a deviant case, suitable for uncovering factors and 
mechanisms missed by existing theoretical accounts overly focused on “successful” cases. 
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Section 2 provides an overview of existing literature followed by the outline of research 
methodology in section 3. Section 4 describes the developments in the Estonian oil shale industry 
between 1995-2016. The analysis of the case is presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes and 
summarizes the broader implications of our study for destabilization literature in particular and for 
transitions literature more generally. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Industry regime and industry destabilization 
Much of the existing literature on industry destabilization is based on the Triple Embeddedness 
Framework (Geels, 2014a) that focuses on the interaction of an “industry regime” with its 
environment. The industry regime is defined as a set of industry-specific rules (e.g. technical 
knowledge and capabilities, mindsets and values, regulations and standards) guiding the behaviour 
of and providing stability for industry actors. It is situated in two types of environments: 1) econom-
ic environment, consisting of various actors in direct commercial transactions with the industry (e.g. 
suppliers of resources and raw materials, finance, technologies, knowledge as well as consumers), 
and; 2) socio-political environment, consisting of policy-makers, civil society and the public. Indus-
try destabilization might therefore be described as a process in which the accumulated pressure 
from economic or socio-political environments (e.g. changing demand, increasing competition, 
normative contestation by activists, adoption of new laws) weakens the reproduction of core regime 
elements (Turnheim and Geels, 2012). This involves an array of strategic responses from the indus-
try such as economic positioning (e.g. marketing, supply chain management), investments and in-
novation, corporate policy-making (e.g. lobbying) and framing (e.g. advertising, awareness cam-
paigns) (Kungl and Geels, 2017). In general, one can distinguish between internally- and externally-
oriented strategies: whereas the first attempt to alter the firm itself, the second are aimed at shaping 
the environment of the firm (Geels, 2014a). 
 
Application of this framework to industry destabilization has shown that the growing intensity of 
external pressures is matched with changes in responses from industry players whereby the 
gradually weakening commitment to the industry regime elements creates chances for more 
expansive industrial transformation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012, 2013). Moreover, the sequence and 
alignment of different pressures might considerably facilitate industrial downfall (Kungl and Geels, 
2017). The Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model (Penna and Geels, 2012, 2015; Geels and 
Penna, 2015) conceptualizes how this destabilizing effect is mediated through chains of interactions 
between various social groups (figure 1). It proposes the following ideal-typical explanation of 
industry destabilization: 
1. A specific issue with the industry (e.g. the high carbon emission rates of fossil fuel indus-
tries are linked to climate change) is first framed by social activists while industry actors fail 
to recognize it or downplay its importance; 
2. Social movements are formed that push the issue on the public agenda and give rise to pub-
lic concerns. Industry actors engage in defensive responses such as closed industry fronts 
while exploring incremental technological solutions; 
3. Policymakers feel the pressure to become involved, creating investigative committees and 
organizing public debates. Industry actors bring up reasons why radical change is unneces-
sary or impossible. They promise to implement incremental solutions while secretly hedging 
into radical alternatives or diversifying into new product markets; 
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4. New substantial legislation is introduced and implemented by policymakers. Industry actors 
contest the new policies while increasing investment in R&D. A new market share emerges 
as “moral consumers” adopt early radical alternatives; 
5. Changes in policies, consumer preferences or public discourse bring about the rise of new 
markets. Some industrial actors see this as an opportunity to reorient towards new markets 
while also recreating themselves with a new identity and mission related to addressing the 
issue at stake (Penna and Geels, 2015). 
Actors 
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Figure 1. Accumulation of problem-related pressures and industry responses in the ‘linear’ DILC model (based on 
Geels and Penna, 2015; Penna and Geels, 2015). 
Although the DILC model provides a promising avenue for explaining industry destabilization, it 
currently suffers from two oversights. First, its focus on the interplay of actor coalitions and strate-
gic industry responses tends to stress the linear unfolding of industry destabilization towards a more 
sustainable solution although empirical research has indicated that issue lifecycles usually exhibit a 
“cyclical” path where the external pressures and industry responses move forwards and backwards 
between different phases (Geels and Penna 2015; Penna and Geels 2012, 2015). While the DILC 
model does not offer a good explanation for this, Geels (2014b) has suggested that one of the key 
factors might be political intervention at the local level where industry actors tend to form close 
alliances with policymakers, thereby influencing political decisions related to the industry. Second, 
the DILC model is not very sensitive to the importance of geographical context: while in principle it 
allows for the possibility that pressures from the global environment might differ from those exert-
ed by the local context of industries, these distinctions have not been explored in empirical research. 
2.2. Socio-spatial embeddedness and multi-scalarity 
In contrast to the literature on industry stabilization the importance of place is strongly stressed by 
geographical approaches to transitions. Truffer and Coenen (2012) have invoked the notion of 
“socio-spatial embeddedness” to signify the multiple territorial, social and cultural advantages 
enjoyed by socio-technical regimes in particular locations. Examples of place-specific elements 
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include urban and regional visions and policies, informal localized institutions (Hansen and Coenen, 
2015; Raven et al., 2012), natural resource endowments, physical infrastructure (Bridge et al., 2013; 
Hansen and Coenen, 2015), regional technological and industrial specialization as well as the role 
of consumers in local market formation (Hansen and Coenen, 2015). Others have stressed the 
importance of linkages across national and international scales such as multi-level governance and 
policy mobilities (Hansen and Coenen, 2015; Sengers and Raven, 2015), buzz-pipelines, 
international transfer of knowledge, global production networks (Sengers and Raven, 2015), 
epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks and the global civil society (Raven et al., 
2012). The most recent studies have consequently attempted to encompass both local and global 
processes, focusing on scale effects (Dahlmann et al., 2016; Haan, 2017; Ramiller and Schmidt, 
2017), actor-networks and relatedness (Chandrashekeran, 2016; Debizet et al., 2016; Boschma, 
2017; Boschma et al., 2017), global innovation systems (Truffer, 2016; Binz and Truffer, 2017) or 
politics and power (Becker et al., 2016; Hess et al., 2017). The geographical approaches thus make 
a good case that sustainability transitions (which also involve the destabilization of incumbent 
industries) are shaped by the simultaneous embeddedness of industries across regional, national and 
international scales. In other words, sustainability transitions and industry destabilization are 
inherently multi-scalar processes. 
However, Hansen and Coenen note that while the increased emphasis on the geographical 
dimension in transitions literature has led to the acknowledgement of the role of geography in 
transition dynamics as an empirical matter-of-fact, there is currently “little generalisable knowledge 
about how place-specificity matters for transitions” (2015: 92). In order to systematize existing 
insights we thus draw on Hess’s (2004) critical overview of the notion of embeddedness in 
economic geography literature which distinguishes between three different dimensions of the 
concept: 
1. Territorial embeddedness: the extent to which an actor is “anchored” in particular territories or 
places; 
2. Societal embeddedness: the influence that the social and cultural background of the actors has 
on their action; 
3. Network embeddedness: the involvement of the actor in a social network, i.e. a structure of 
relationships among a set of actors regardless of their local anchoring in particular places. 
Figure 2 applies these dimensions to findings from geographical approaches to transitions. It is 
important to note that each of these forms of embeddedness can serve as a stabilizing resource for 
incumbent industries. For example, an industry might draw on existing natural resource 
endowments, national energy strategies and/or favourable conditions in global energy markets - 
combining forms of territorial, societal and network embeddedness respectively - to argue against 
the need for a fundamental regulatory intervention. The degree to which the industry is successful in 
doing so indicates the degree of its embeddedness to various contexts across multiple scales. Our 
mapping suggests that territorial embeddedness exhibits itself mainly on the local scale while 
societal and network embeddedness can also indicate non-local influences on the industry through 
global economic, political and cultural ties. Hence in contrast to what the DILC model implies, 
there is no straightforward transmission of international pressures on local industries: instead this 
process is mediated through and influenced by national and regional considerations. 
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Figure 2. Types of socio-spatial embeddedness across multiple scales (based on Hess, 2004; Raven et al., 2012; Truffer 
and Coenen, 2012; Bridge et al., 2013; Sengers and Raven, 2015; Hansen and Coenen, 2015). 
2.3. Synthesis: industrial transformation as an interaction of embedding and disembedding 
mechanisms 
The literature review leads us to see industrial transformation as a process that involves two forces 
pulling in opposite directions: 
1. The DILC model as a mechanism that, through the interactions between industry insiders 
and external actors, mediates broader international pressures from socio-political and 
economic environments thereby leading to industry destabilization. In other words, we 
conceptualize DILC as a disembedding mechanism aimed at severing the ties between the 
industry and its regional, national and international context; 
2. This pressure is countered by activities of various social groups, aimed at consolidating the 
societal, territorial and/or network-related ties of the industry to its regional and national 
context. That is, we see these locally-oriented strategies as a (re-)embedding mechanism 
providing stability to the incumbent industry. 
The rest of the paper is devoted to exploring the interaction of these two mechanisms. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Case selection 
The research was based on a single longitudinal case study design (Yin, 2003), employing a deviant 
case selection strategy. A case is deviant if, by reference to a general theoretical understanding, it 
demonstrates a surprising and anomalous value (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Selecting a deviant 
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case is the most useful strategy for detecting omitted variables and mechanisms and discover 
unknown causal pathways (Seawright, 2016). 
While the Estonian oil shale industry has been previously analysed as an exemplary case of path 
dependency (Holmberg, 2008), it can be considered deviant in relation to existing theory on 
industry destabilization. On one hand, there are multiple pressures on the industry regime: 
1. Broader socio-political environment: the Estonian energy regime has been subject to the 
pressures of climate change during the last decades, reinforced by its ratification of the 
Kyoto protocol in 2002 and becoming a member of European Union in 2004. 
2. Availability of alternatives: similarly to other countries Estonia is in a position to benefit 
from the increasingly cost-effective renewable energy technologies. The renewable energy 
market niche has already grown to 25% of final energy consumption while the potential of 
wind, biomass and biogas energy is still largely unused (Eesti Taastuvenergia Koda, 2016). 
3. Issues specific to the Estonian energy regime: a) oil shale has a low Energy Return of 
Investment compared to traditional liquid fuels. Some studies estimate the value to be as low 
as between 1:1 and 2:1 when internal energy is included as an energy cost (Cleveland and 
O’Connor, 2011; Hall et al., 2014); b) oil shale usage has a large negative impact on the 
environment as producing energy from it emits twice as much greenhouse gases than from 
conventional fossil fuels (Cleveland and O’Connor 2011). Due to the impact of the oil shale 
industry, Estonia has one of the largest ecological footprints per capita in Europe (Global 
Footprint Network, 2017); c) the major oil shale deposits are located in North-Eastern 
Estonia close to the Russian border (figure 9). Since Estonia used to be occupied by the 
Soviet Union and the tensions between Russia and Estonia are ongoing the location of oil 
shale deposits can be considered a hazard from the energy security perspective. 
One should expect the combination of these factors - broader environmental pressures, increasing 
viability of alternatives and the fragility of the oil shale based energy regime - to have had a 
substantial impact on the Estonian industry regime toward destabilization and re-orientation. Yet the 
actual share of oil shale in primary electricity supply has remained fairly stable over the last two 
decades (see figure 5). Moreover, the latest National Development Plan of the Energy Sector 
foresees only a modest rise in the share of renewables, with 28% of primary energy consumption 
and 45% of total energy consumption coming from renewables by 2030 (Energiatalgud, 2016). 
Hence the discrepancy between observed pressures and relative stability of the industry regime 
makes the Estonian case a deviant one, implying the presence of certain mechanisms neutralizing 
different pressures. 
3.2. Process-tracing 
The case study employed a process-tracing approach (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Process-tracing is 
a technique for causal inference developed to detect whether a specific causal mechanism mediating 
between certain initial conditions (X) and an outcome (Y) exists or not. Three different variants of 
process-tracing can be distinguished: theory-testing, theory-building and explaining-outcome 
analysis. In this study the primary focus was on explaining the relative stability of the industry 
regime despite the existence of multi-level pressures. Moreover, we hypothesized this outcome to 
be caused by multiple interacting mechanisms. Because of these considerations the explaining-
outcome was deemed the most suitable research strategy. 
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Figure 3. Explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
Explaining-outcome process-tracing uses a combination of deduction and induction (figure 3). In 
the deductive part the theoretical causal mechanism, obtained from the existing literature, is tested 
against empirical data to assess its ability to account for the observed outcome. In this case, we first 
assumed that the Estonian case follows the DILC model which is depicted as a five-phase process 
between external pressures and industry responses leading to industry destabilization. However, for 
deviant cases the existing mechanism is unable to explain the full extent of the outcome by 
definition. The inductive strategy is then used to gather additional empirical evidence and build a 
more comprehensive explanation. In this case, additional evidence that did not fit with the DILC 
model was collected and systematized under the categories of socio-spatial embeddedness. 
The application of process-tracing strategy involves a systematic search for and combination of 
various pieces of empirical evidence to demonstrate the existence and interaction of mechanisms. 
For this purpose data was collected and combined from the following sources: 
1. 603 online news items about environmental problems related to the oil shale industry from 
the two biggest Estonian online news portals Postimees and Delfi covering the period 
between 1995 and 2016. The newspaper articles were found from the online databases with 
a Boolean search by combining the key words (keskkon* OR kliima) AND põlevkivi2. The 
results of these searches were then manually reviewed and irrelevant articles excluded; 
2. Official public documents, including a) annual reports and yearbooks of the enterprises in oil 
shale industry and the Estonian Renewable Energy association and; b) strategies and 
development plans of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communications of Estonia; 
                                                 
2 Translation from Estonian: (environment* OR climate) AND oil shale 
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3. Secondary literature to find additional evidence about the activities of policy-makers and 
industry actors; 
4. Statistical databases and public opinion polls to represent environmental pressures on the 
industry. 
Data analysis proceeded in four consecutive steps: 
1. Visual observation of time series data to divide the case into periods. As an indicator of 
socio-political pressure, we counted the number of articles on climate change in the online 
databases of two of the most popular Estonian newspapers, Delfi and Postimees. As an 
indicator of economic pressure, we used the average annual OPEC crude oil price because 
the competitiveness of the oil shale industry depends to a large extent on the fluctuations of 
world crude oil price (Eesti Energia et al. 2016). The year 1995 was chosen as the starting 
point because of several key events related to the focal issue of climate change (the first 
Conference of Parties (COP) in Berlin and the publication of the IPCC Second Assessment 
Report) as well as for reasons related to the availability of data (the online news archives 
which constituted the main source of data only dated back to 1995); 
2. Content analysis of online news items to identify key actors, events, the sequence of events 
and causal relations between them. All the news items were read and coded based on the 
coding manual (see Appendix A for details). Deductive coding was used for DILC 
categories and open-ended coding for events related to various dimensions of socio-spatial 
embeddedness. In the latter case the coding scheme was amended through successive 
iterations; 
3. The findings of the quantitative content analysis were amended with qualitative evidence 
from public documents and secondary sources in order to construct detailed narratives and 
event timelines of each phase (see figure 5); 
4. As a final step, we relied on the pattern-matching technique (Seawright, 2016; Yin, 2003) to 
compare the observed events with the theoretical pattern as described by the DILC model. 
The findings on socio-spatial embeddedness were then used to see whether they could 
account for deviations from the model. 
4. Case study 
4.1. Periodization 
Based on the combination of socio-political and economic pressures we divided the case into four 
phases. The first period from 1995 to 2002 saw climate change being framed as an issue for the first 
time in Estonia following the agreement of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 and the preparations for 
joining the EU. The industry was troubled by economic problems tracing back to the Soviet era and 
amplified by the Russian financial crisis in 1998. In the second period from 2003 to 2009, climate 
change reached the political agenda mainly due to Estonia’s unification with the EU in 2004 and the 
subsequent build-up for the COP15 in Copenhagen. However, the industry grew steadily because of 
favourable oil prices, experiencing only a minor shock at the end of the period due to the global 
financial crisis. The third period was characterized by a decreasing interest in climate change due to 
the failure of the parties to reach a global agreement in Copenhagen while the industry prospered as 
the crude oil price increased rapidly again after the shock of 2009. The societal and economic 
pressures aligned in the fourth period beginning in 2014 with an abrupt drop in crude oil price and 
the global agreement on climate change adopted at COP21 in Paris. These pressures sent the 
industry into an acute crisis the results of which are still to be determined. 
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Figure 5 provides a visual summary of the case, putting the timeline of main events in the context of 
socio-political and economic pressures, and indicating the changes in the energy mix (expressed as 
the ratio of oil shale and renewable energy supply). 
4.2. The de- and re-stabilization of the Estonian oil shale industry regime (1995–2016) 
4.2.1. Framing of the climate change issue and post-Soviet economic struggle (1995–2002) 
In the 1990s, the oil shale industry was grappling with severe problems the causes of which can be 
traced back to the Soviet period and the subsequent transition to a market economy after Estonia 
restored its national independence in 1991. First, the industry was still using the heavily 
contaminating pulverized fuel combustion technology developed in the 1930s. The technology had 
a big environmental impact, including air pollution and waste, and was also economically 
inefficient. Huge investments into new technologies were needed but the firms were struggling with 
large debt instead. The technological problems were magnified in 1998 by the eruption of the 
Russian financial crisis and a subsequent drop in the world crude oil price that abruptly decreased 
shale oil export revenues. The changed market conditions proved to be too difficult to overcome for 
one of the companies, Kiviter, which went bankrupt in 1999 but was subsequently recreated as Viru 
Keemia Grupp (VKG). However, the permanent dissolution of the industry was to be avoided at all 
costs as this scenario was seen as a serious threat to national security because of high 
unemployment rates in the mainly Russian-speaking industrial region and the legacy of the failed 
regional autonomy referendum in the border city of Narva in 1993 (referred to as the “Narva crisis”). 
The government made several exceptions for 
the industry such as implementing pollution 
and waste charges that were 10 times smaller 
than the charges for similar toxic waste in 
other sectors. Consequently, the industry had 
made barely any attempts at recycling the 
spent shale that was the by-product of the dry 
distillation process and the waste was simply 
dumped in big piles around the industrial 
regions of Kiviõli and Kohtla-Järve that 
eventually formed distinctive hills on the 
landscape of Ida-Virumaa (figure 4). This led 
to serious problems like groundwater 
contamination and the spontaneous 
combustion of waste. 
Doubts over the economic and environmental sustainability of oil shale utilization sparked a wider 
debate about the future of the national energy system. Some environmental organizations called for 
drawing up a long-term national energy strategy based on the principles of sustainable development. 
They argued for the advantages of renewables and proposed a direction towards the decentralization 
of the energy system as laid out in a new long-term plan for the utilization of alternative energy 
until 2050 presented to the government by the Estonian Green Movement. However, both 
policymakers and industry representatives largely ignored these proposals and were supportive of 
an oil shale based system. They emphasized that the survival of the industry was crucial for regional 
and national energy security as well as for the local job market in the industrial Ida-Virumaa region 
– arguments that have remained the same over the years (figure 6). 
Figure 4. Spent shale hill near Kiviõli. Source: Olev 
Mihkelmaa, Wikipedia.  
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Figure 5. Visual summary of the case (continued on the next page). 
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Figure 5 (continued). Visual summary of the case. 
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Environmental concerns slowly started to gain public attention. In 1994, Estonia ratified the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, thus becoming a member of the countries 
dedicated to fighting against global warming and in 1995, Estonia had to present a national climate 
report for the first COP in Berlin. 1997 saw the international adoption of the Kyoto protocol which 
was ratified by Estonia in 2002. With this step, the government took on the obligation to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 8% in the period from 1990 to 2012. However, the obligation did not 
place any significant pressure on the Estonian government and the oil shale industry. The reason for 
this was that after Estonia gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the transition to 
a market economy led to the closing of several inefficient Soviet industries and production facilities 
and immediately reduced the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50%. In spite of this, 
the environmental impact of the industry was still huge and environmental organizations started to 
make demands on the government to significantly increase taxes on air pollution and waste. The 
pressure eventually led to a slight increase of pollution and waste charges at the end of the 1990s.  
 
Figure 6. The importance of industry-related problems for different groups of actors from 1995 to 2016. The data was 
collected by the coding of online news items from Estonian daily newspaper archives (based on the categories A4.2-4, 
B1.1, C1.1-2 and C1.6 in Appendix A). 
Also on the agenda of the government were preparations for joining the European Union. With 
regard to the oil shale industry, the aim of the government was to achieve exceptions from meeting 
some of the conditions of the environmental directives of the EU which were necessary for the 
survival and further development of the industry. As a result of the negotiations, the European 
Commission agreed to give oil shale a temporary status, thus postponing the implementation of 
several important EU directives. The special conditions guaranteed by the temporary status 
included: 1) a prolonged deadline until 2016 for the renovation of the old power plants to meet the 
air quality standards of the EU; 2) a prolonged deadline until 2013 for the transition to an open 
electricity market and; 3) financial support for research and development of best available 
technologies (BATs) for energy and shale oil production. 
The unification negotiations with the EU clearly influenced the strategic decisions of the industry. 
For example, the new-born VKG that was created after the bankruptcy of Kiviter in 1999 
immediately shifted its focus on R&D into BATs for oil production as well as diversification into 
fine chemical products and motor fuels produced from recycled car tires. Meanwhile, the state-
owned Eesti Energia was leading the race and had already drawn up a plan by 1997 for partially 
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replacing the old technologies with the new circulating fluidized bed combustion technology. The 
early investments into renewable energy remained rather small-scale in comparison to oil shale 
projects. Eesti Energia first experimented with renewables in 1997 when the first industrial 150 kW 
wind turbine was mounted off the coast of Hiiumaa. Some demand for renewables from “green 
consumers” is indicated by the fact that Eesti Energia started offering a “green energy” package for 
domestic households in 2000. 
4.2.2. Joining the EU, “gold rush” and incremental innovation (2003–2009) 
The actions of the government following the ratification of the Kyoto protocol and joining the EU 
did not live up to the expectations of climate activists and in 2004 the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
was presented with an annual “award” by the Estonian Green Movement for endangering the 
Earth’s climate. Meanwhile, however, the Ministry of Environment revived the plan of an 
ecological tax reform initially proposed by environmental organizations. There were multiple 
reasons for this development, including the forthcoming unification with the EU and the successful 
lobby by activists. The reform foresaw the implementation of the “polluter pays” principle which 
meant that those responsible for pollution would also be held responsible for compensating the 
environmental damage. In 2005, the comprehensive “Environmental charges law” was adopted that 
included all the previous taxes and charges in a unified framework. The new law did not bring about 
any fundamental changes in the general system of the charges that had been in place from the early 
1990s. However, the charge rates were significantly increased (figure 7) and fewer exceptions were 
allowed for the oil shale industry. 
For the industry, the ecological tax reform as well as Estonia’s unification with the EU led to an 
urgent need for developing new technologies and building production facilities that would meet the 
new and stricter environmental standards. Fortunately for the industry, the beginning of the 2000s 
marked the start of a long period of economic growth due to a fourfold increase in the world crude 
oil price between 2001 and 2008 which made big investments possible. Environmental innovation 
was mainly focused on the installation of new environmental management systems based on the 
ISO 14000 and ISO 14001 standards (2002) and the installation of sulphur treatment equipment for 
the old production facilities at VKG (2008) and Eesti Energia (2009). Perhaps the most radical 
technological change though was the opening of the first power plants using the new circulating 
fluidized bed combustion technology at Eesti Energia in 2004. 
However, the biggest investments were made not into energy but oil production. Encouraged by the 
rocketing oil price, both Eesti Energia and VKG started developing new shale oil technologies 
(called Enefit and Petroter) that would allow for the full utilization of oil shale and all the by-
products. This was achieved with a comprehensive technological process based on the recycling of 
spent shale as well as the surplus heat and gas which was reused for energy production. The 
building of the first Petroter oil factory started in 2007 and it was already working by the time the 
cornerstone was laid for the first Enefit factory in 2009. At the same time, the industry was also 
looking at ways of diversifying into new product markets, including 1) the large-scale production of 
fine chemical products (started at VKG in 2006); 2) the plans for developing a cement production 
technology based on the recycled spent shale and; 3) a new technology for the production of shale-
oil-based motor fuels for which VKG received financial support from the government. 
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Figure 7. The collection of environmental taxes in Estonia from 2005 to 2015. Source: Statistics Estonia. 
The huge investments into new oil factories meant that the industry was in need of more resources. 
This led to a “gold rush” demonstrated by the expansion of mining areas in the early 2000s. As all 
of the potential mining sites were situated in Ida-Virumaa (figure 8), this trend sparked heavy 
opposition from environmental organizations and local people who worried about the deterioration 
of living conditions in the local municipalities and the damage to the natural environment in and 
around the mining area. On the other hand, both local and national policymakers were mainly 
concerned with new employment opportunities and energy security. For example, the mayor of 
Kiviõli claimed that the failure to agree upon a new development plan would lead the whole city 
into a “social catastrophe” (Postimees, 07.08.2007) while the Minister of Environment added that 
oil shale is our “national wealth” and a guarantee of our energy independence (Postimees, 
10.11.2006). These arguments were supported by the president of Estonia who stated that oil shale 
is “a matter of our security and independence” and that miners are “the backbone of Ida-Virumaa” 
(Postimees, 26.08.2007). However, after meeting with the opposition, the government decided to 
stop issuing mining permits to companies until a national development plan for the utilization of oil 
shale had been created. The plan was finally 
agreed upon in 2008 and it prescribed an 
annual limit of 20 mln tonnes for the 
extraction of oil shale. The government saw 
this as a compromise because mining 
permits for over 23 mln tonnes had already 
been issued and altogether, permit requests 
had been made by companies for the 
extraction of up to 26 mln tonnes of oil shale 
annually. However, the 20 mln tonnes limit 
was a significant increase when compared to 
the previous limit of 15 mln tonnes and the 
actual extraction capacities which were 
around 10 mln tonnes in the early 2000s 
(figure 9). In addition, measures and 
incentives aimed at the development of more efficient and environmentally friendly technologies 
that were initially included in the development plan had been removed from the document after 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
€
Pollution
charges
Mineral
resource
extraction
charges
Water
abstraction
charges
Figure 8. The location of actual (dark brown) and potential 
(light brown) oil shale resources in Estonia. Source: Eesti 
põlevkivitööstuse aastaraamat 2014. 
 
17 
 
criticism from industry representatives. 
The period also marked a significant expansion in the renewables sector as the overall share of 
renewable energy in final energy consumption increased from 16% in 2006 to over 25% in 2011. 
However, these statistics are somewhat misleading as the growth of the niche was largely due to the 
use of wood which was burned in renovated oil shale power plants while the perks of more 
sustainable resources such as wind and solar energy remained still largely unused. The other 
developments in the renewable energy niche were rather small-scale, including the establishment of 
new local combined heat and power stations, the installation of new solar panels and wind turbines 
by microproducers and the renovation of hydropower stations. The industry invested into some new 
wind farms near Narva (built on an old ash field) and Aulepa (the biggest one in the Baltics so far) 
but also into a new waste-to-energy unit at the Iru power station. The development of the renewable 
energy sector was given some 
support by the government with the 
introduction of renewable energy 
subsidies in 2007 that enabled 
ongoing projects to be finished and 
some new projects to be planned. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
used exactly the same arguments in 
support of the renewable energy 
subsidies that were used for the 
protection of the oil shale industry, 
namely that renewables were more 
efficient, created new jobs and that 
a decentralized energy system 
would significantly increase 
national energy security 
(Postimees, 06.11.2003). 
In 2006, another long-term green energy plan was proposed to the government by environmental 
organizations which foresaw a transition to a renewables-based and decentralized energy system. In 
the same year, the Estonian Green Party was established. They won 6% of the seats in the 
parliamentary election the following year and developed into a strong advocacy organization for 
climate change. For example, before COP14 in Poznan in 2008, the party delivered a symbolic 
gesture by giving a small clock to the Estonian Minister of the Environment representing the fact 
that time for tackling climate change was running out. Public awareness of climate change was also 
significantly increased as a poll conducted in 2008 found that climate change was considered as the 
second biggest global environmental threat by Estonian people. In 2009, the government 
collaborated with the Green Party to implement another rapid twofold increase in environmental 
charges as part of the ecological tax reform. This plan was greeted with heavy opposition from the 
oil shale industry who were grappling with the economic difficulties caused by the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent drop in oil price. For example, the CEO of Eesti Energia claimed that “oil 
shale provides us with energy security and it would be unwise to place high taxes on the oil shale 
industry” (Postimees, 12.06.2009). Instead, he argued for a tax reform that would make the charging 
of taxes from the oil shale industry dependent on the world crude oil price. The contestation to the 
new policies also involved the Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries (FECI) the criticism of 
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which focused on the loss of up to 4000 jobs in the industry. The dispute resulted in the 
implementation of lower tax rates than the ones that were initially planned. For example, the 
pollution charges that were supposed to be increased threefold were only raised by 20%. At the 
same time, the government was again trying to negotiate exceptions from the EU directives for the 
oil shale industry. The specific demands were that the oil shale industry should continue to get free 
carbon credits (emission allowances) under the emissions trading system which had previously 
allowed Estonian oil shale companies to raise extra funds by selling their surplus credits. The 
surplus of carbon credits was due to the fact that the base year for the reduction of carbon emissions 
was 1990 when Estonia was still part of the Soviet Union and thus had very high carbon emission 
rates. In an interview before an EU climate and energy framework meeting in Brussels, the Minister 
of Economic Affairs of Estonia said that “oil shale is a gift from the God”, “the CO2 emissions of 
the oil shale industry have no impact on the melting of ice on the North Pole” and that “no one can 
force us to give up oil shale [because] there are no alternatives and it is a matter of national 
security” (Postimees, 28.02.2008). 
4.2.3. State investments into oil shale and industry prosperity (2010–2013) 
After the failure to reach a much-anticipated global agreement on climate change at COP15 in 
Copenhagen in 2009, the public attention to the issue faded for a while. However, the government 
was still under fire at the beginning of 2010s for the decisions that had been made concerning the 
state-owned Eesti Energia, including massive state investments into the renovation of old energy 
blocks and the building of new oil factories as well as limiting renewable energy subsidies which 
put the construction of new wind farms on hold. Furthermore, heated debate resulted from the 
government’s new plan of building two new 300 MW oil shale power plants near the village of 
Auvere in Ida-Virumaa. These plants were supposed to be based on the circulating fluidized bed 
combustion technology which was also used in the renovated energy blocks at old power plants and 
allowed for the utilization of up to 50% of biomass in energy production. The leaders of several 
environmental organizations signed an open letter to the Minister in which they expressed concerns 
over the growing environmental impact of the oil shale industry and accused him of working 
against the EU energy and climate policy. Despite heavy criticism, the government decided to start 
building the first 300 MW power plant in 2012. The 638 mln € facility which represented the 
biggest state investment ever into the Estonian economy was partly financed by free carbon credits 
requested from the EU that absolved the oil shale industry from the obligation of paying carbon 
emission charges. 
The decision was seen by many to go against the national development plans as well as the strategy 
of Eesti Energia which aimed at a more efficient use of oil shale by focusing on oil production 
instead of energy. For example, the CEO of Eesti Energia said that the construction of the Auvere 
power plant “was a political decision with the goal of increasing energy security but economically it 
was not a reasonable solution” (BNS, 27.10.2014)3. The Minister of Economic Affairs agreed that 
the argument of energy security was “absolutely important” in making the decision which was 
heavily opposed by the Social Democratic Party who compared it to “playing Russian roulette”, 
pointing out that it was based on inadequate economic calculations (Delfi, 17.10.2012). They also 
claimed that the argument of energy security amounts to nothing more than raising unaccounted 
fear towards Russia and that the building of new oil shale power plants “does not increase our 
energy security in any way” (Delfi, 28.10.2012). Instead, they suggested that real energy security 
                                                 
3 In 2014, the economic aspects indeed proved to be decisive as Eesti Energia opted against the construction of the 
second 300 MW power plant that was also initially planned in Auvere. 
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for Estonia lies in a decentralized energy system with good overseas connections. 
After the shock of 2009, the world oil price rocketed again in 2010 and 2011 which brought 
substantial profits for the industry and allowed for some additional investments. While Eesti 
Energia started building the Auvere power plant, VKG put lots of effort into the full utilization of 
oil shale and the recycling of by-products and residues. For example, a new lime factory was 
established in 2013 which used several by-products of the industry as an input in the lime 
production process and the lime was used in turn in sulphur treatment equipment. In addition, the 
residues of the mining process were used in road construction and the possibilities of biofuel 
production were explored. At Eesti Energia, new nitrogen capture systems were installed on old 
power plants and the installation of sulphur treatment equipment also continued. Apart from that, 
however, most of the projects for reducing the environmental impact of the industry were finished 
by 2011. Among these was the reconstruction of the oil container park as well as the closing of 
contagious landfills at VKG. In spite of that, the carbon and sulphur emission rates at VKG still 
increased as a result of the opening of the new Petroter oil factory.  
At the same time, uncertainty prevailed in the renewables sector. Several projects were put on hold 
as the previously introduced subsidies were cut and the government could not agree on new 
legislation. This was also evident in the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption 
which rose by almost 10% between 2006 and 2011 but has not increased since then. Some rather 
small-scale developments included the establishment of new wind farms in Paldiski (40 MW) and 
Ojaküla (7MW) by the private company Nelja Energia as well as an increase in the installation rate 
of solar panels by domestic households. In 2011, the most important renewable energy 
entrepreneurs and associations united and formed the Estonian Renewable Energy Council which 
quickly assumed the role of a vocal advocacy group. Soon after, a heated discussion emerged over 
the decision by Eesti Energia to use woodchips for energy production in the renovated energy 
blocks which enabled up to 50% use of biofuels. While Eesti Energia tried to frame the decision as 
beneficial for the environment, the Renewable Energy Council argued that “not every use of 
renewables is environmentally friendly” and that burning woodchips for energy production is an 
extremely inefficient option (Delfi, 13.07.2011). The use of woodchips was stopped in 2012 after 
ongoing confusion over renewable energy subsidies. In the same year, the Renewable Energy 
Council came forward with a new plan called Renewable Energy 100% which again proposed a 
transition to a renewables-based energy system and included detailed analysis and steps for the 
transition to be achieved by 2030. The proposals were greeted by the chairman of the Estonian 
Green Party who said that “everything is ready for a shift to renewable energy” (Delfi, 29.08.2012). 
4.2.4. Pressure alignment: oil price crisis and the Paris agreement (2014–2016) 
In late 2014, the industry was hit by several simultaneous pressures which put it in a very difficult 
situation. First, there was an abrupt drop in the world crude oil price which eventually fell over 
twofold between 2014 and 2016. This caused serious economic difficulties for the industry as 
energy production in the facilities based on old technologies became economically infeasible.  
Secondly, the government started planning an annual rise of environmental charges by 20% which 
was met by an unprecedented contestation from FECI. It launched a massive campaign called “Our 
welfare lies in our natural resources!” the message of which was that the tax raises would lead to the 
bankruptcy of the whole industry (figure 10). As a result, 24 000 people in Ida-Virumaa would 
become unemployed, annual tax revenue in the amount of 250 mln € would be lost and Estonia 
would lose its energy security and independence. The chairman of FECI said that there were no 
alternatives to fossil fuels and that “stories about wood and wind as the basis of our energy system 
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belong to the fairy tale genre” (Delfi, 20.07.2014). The Ministry of Environment, the Renewable 
Energy Council and the Council of Environmental NGOs accused the federation of spreading false 
information and manipulating with public opinion, with the latter presenting the annual “award” for 
the most environmentally harmful deed to FECI. A counter-campaign was also launched by the 
Estonian Green Movement and the Renewable Energy Council with the aim to renegotiate the 
meaning of “energy security” (figure 11). The organizers of the campaign stressed that the import of 
fossil fuels is unreasonably expensive for EU states and it supports the flourishing of undemocratic 
regimes. 
 
Figure 10. Poster from the campaign “Our welfare lies in our natural resources!” (“How is it possible that Estonia is 
renouncing its energy security?”). Source: http://maavara.ee/. 
At the end of 2014, the Ministry of Environment surrendered to the lobby of FECI by announcing 
an annual rise in tax rates by 3-6% for the next ten years instead of the initially planned 20%. 
However, the industry was still struggling with economic problems caused by the falling world 
crude oil price and in late 2014, several hundred people in Kohtla-Järve became unemployed as 
VKG temporarily closed the old oil factories that were using the economically inefficient Kiviter 
technology. The unemployment shock caused panic in the government and a plan was made 
immediately for a tax reform proposed by the industry that would make the oil shale extraction 
charges depend on the fluctuations of oil price as well as for raising mining limits so that the 
company could extract more resources from its own mine instead of buying it from the mines of 
Eesti Energia. In the summer of 2015, the government implemented legislation that allowed the oil 
shale industry to use up all of the mining capacities that had been previously left unused from the 
limit of 20 mln tonnes since 2009. This meant that, for example, if the industry extracted only 15 
mln tonnes of oil shale in 2010, it could now use up the 5 mln tonnes that was left unused that year. 
The decision was heavily criticized by the Estonian Green Party who called it “a crime against the 
ecosystem” and by the Council of Environmental NGOs who said that mining capacities should be 
decisively reduced instead (Postimees, 08.06.2015). However, the change of legislation worked for 
the industry as the closed factories were re-opened and people were re-hired. Months later, the 
construction of a third new oil factory based on the Petroter technology was finished and oil 
production began there too. 
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Figure 11. Poster from the campaign “Energy security? – Yes! 
With renewable energy we will be independent!”. Source:  
https://www.facebook.com/eestirohelineliikumine/.  
The oil price continued to fall though and 
in early 2016, VKG again had to lay off 
500 employees, announcing that in these 
economic conditions, the company “could 
survive for no more than 24 months”. The 
economic downturn also brought 
difficulties for Eesti Energia who were 
forced to make about 250 miners redundant. 
Demands were made by the industry for a 
temporary reduction of all environmental 
charges and once again the government 
reacted quickly by decreasing most of the 
tax rates on the industry to the level of 
2009 until the end of 2017. The decision 
saved 43 mln € for the sector but was 
heavily criticized by the Minister of 
Environment who pointed out that the loss 
of tax revenue would mean heavy cuts for 
the government’s budget for future 
investments into environmental projects. 
Moreover, the Renewable Energy Council 
claimed that the “favouring of oil shale 
production has become a norm in Estonia 
that the lawmakers are not willing to 
change even in a drastically changed 
economic situation” (Delfi, 18.03.2016). 
FECI responded that the state “needs to 
develop further that which has been 
accomplished and not destroy it” and 
advised the environmental organizations “not to bite the hand that feeds”, referring to the fact that 
environmental NGOs are partly financed with the tax money collected from the oil shale industry 
(Postimees, 19.04.2016). As a result of the tax reduction, VKG re-hired 350 people as production 
continued again in the old Kiviter factories. 
While the government was making concessions to the oil shale industry, climate activists were calling 
for a radical reform of Estonia’s energy system and the oil shale sector. In the wake of COP21 in 
Paris, climate change featured heavily in the media again and a first-ever public demonstration 
demanding action against climate change was organized in the capital city of Tallinn. At the same 
time, the government had begun working on several new development plans. The first of them was 
a comprehensive national strategy on climate change called “The Basis of Climate Policy until 
2050” the main objective of which was an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emission rates by 2050 
compared to 1990. This goal was to be achieved mainly by exporting oil and the emissions resulting 
from oil shale utilization. The document was criticized by environmental activists who stated that 
“climate change is a global problem and therefore attention should be paid to emissions resulting 
from the products made in Estonia regardless of whether these products are consumed here or 
exported” (Delfi, 16.08.2016). As the Paris agreement was successfully signed in late 2015, the 
prevailing opinion among activists was that the success of the Paris meeting meant “game over” for 
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the oil shale industry (Delfi, 06.12.2015). However, in the same week, the Estonian parliament was 
also discussing a new national development plan for the utilization of oil shale. According to the 
new plan, the mining limit would remain at 20 mln tonnes for the next 15 years and two new mines 
would be opened during that period. In addition, the implementation programme for the new 
development plan foresaw government investments of 5,7 mln € into new oil shale technologies. 
The Minister of Environment acknowledged that while Estonia would eventually need to stop 
relying on oil shale, there was no chance of that happening in the next 15 years. Soon after, a new 
national development plan for the energy economy was also agreed upon which set a goal of a 50% 
share of renewables in domestic electricity consumption by 2030. This aim was described as 
“moderate”, “unambitious” and “visionless” by energy experts (Müürileht, 30.01.2017). 
5. Analysis and discussion 
We start from comparing the expected pattern of DILC to the events observed in the case (see table 
1 for a summary). We find that the model seems to perform fairly well - but for particular groups 
only. In the case of activists there is evidence of increasing public visibility of the climate change 
agenda, public concern about the unsustainability of oil shale energy and increasing organization on 
both national and local levels (e.g. establishing the Green Party, signing local petitions, arranging 
public protests). In the case of consumers one can observe early demand from “green consumers”, 
the gradually increasing share of renewables and the emergence of a consumer organization (the 
Estonian Renewable Energy Council). Minor deviations in the third phase can be attributed to the 
decreased visibility of climate change agenda, reflected in local legislative confusion and stagnation 
in the renewables sector. On the other hand, the expected actions from the policy-makers 
(introduction of substantive legislation) and industry actors (large-scale diversification and 
investment into radical alternatives) deviate considerably from the DILC model. Instead, the 
industry was heavily investing into new oil shale power plants and mines in the third period and 
implementing fairly incremental technological improvements such as end-of-pipe solutions. This 
process was considerably supported by local policy-makers through various means (e.g. adopting 
plans to continue investments into oil shale energy and requesting free carbon credits from the EU 
to finance these investments). 
This finding can be partially explained by reference to simultaneous changes in international 
economic and socio-political environments. During the first two periods (1995-2009) the climate 
change agenda gradually was intensifying and the world crude oil price steadily increasing: these 
counter-acting forces, one implying substantial change and another a continuation of the existing 
path, led to mixed responses by both the industry actors and the policy-makers on national and 
regional levels. Hence, on one hand industry actors continued investments into the existing regime 
while also experimenting with renewable energy packages for “green consumers”. Policy-makers, 
on the other hand, attempted to cater to the expectations of the local energy industry while also 
dealing with emerging pressures towards sustainability. This resulted in a paradoxical situation in 
which Estonia was implementing gradual ecological reforms to conform to the regulations of the 
European Union while simultaneously negotiating exceptions for the oil shale industry from that 
very union.
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Table 1. Environmental pressures and the destabilization of Estonian oil shale industry: expected vs. observed patterns. Green cells designate a match with the expected DILC pattern 
(see figure 1) whereas red cells mark deviations. 
Period Activists and social movements Policymakers Consumers and suppliers Industry 
Broad indicators of 
economic and socio-
political pressures 
1995-2002 
Environmental organizations demand 
higher charges on the industry 
UNFCCC 
members agree 
on Kyoto protocol 
Eesti Energia 
introduces domestic 
renewable energy 
package for „green 
consumers“ 
Kiviter goes bankrupt and is 
recreated as VKG 
Economic: 1st half: 
Russian financial crisis 
and loss in shale oil 
export revenue; 2nd 
half: gradual increase in 
world crude oil price 
Environmental organizations propose 
an alternative energy plan until 2050 
Estonia starts unification 
negotiations with EU and achieves 
a temporary status for the oil shale 
industry 
Eesti Energia mounts first 
industrial wind turbine  
Socio-political: 
emergence and gradual 
increase of the climate 
change agenda 
2003-2009 
Environmental organizations 
„award“ government for lack of 
action against climate change 
Ecological  tax reform 
 implemented 
Share of renewables in final 
energy consumption increases to 
25% 
Rise in environmental tax rates 
opposed by the Federation of 
Estonian Chemical Industries Economic: threefold 
increase in world crude 
oil price 
Environmental organizations propose 
a green energy plan until 2020 
Estonia joins the EU and requests 
free carbon credits 
Installation of end-of-pipe 
technologies such as sulphur and 
nitrogen treatment equipment 
Estonian Green Party established 
Government decides to support the 
building of a new 600MW oil shale 
power plant at Auvere 
Eesti Energia and VKG start 
building new oil factories based 
on Enefit and Petroter 
technologies 
Socio-political: more 
than twofold increase in 
the presence of the 
climate change agenda 
in the media 
Eesti Energia starts building the 
biggest wind farm in  the Baltics 
and a new waste-to-energy unit 
at Iru power plant 
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2010-2013 
Environmental organizations 
„award“ Minister of Economics two 
years in a row for endangering climate 
EU adopts Industrial Emissions 
Directive aimed at the 
implementation of best available 
technologies 
Estonian Renewable Energy 
Council established 
Eesti Energia starts building the 
new 300MW oil shale power 
plant at Auvere 
Economic: after a brief 
drop during the global 
financial crisis the 
world crude oil price 
rises to a new high 
Local people sign a petition to EU 
over severe air pollution at Kiviõli 
Chemical Plant 
Free carbon credits requested from 
the EU and used for investment into 
new oil shale projects 
 
Two new Enefit and Petroter oil 
factories opened, building of two 
more starts 
Free carbon credits requested from 
the EU and used for investment into 
new oil shale projects 
First new oil shale mine in 40 
years opened at Ojamaa Socio-political: 
decreasing visibility of 
climate change agenda Environmental organizations present 
the Renewable Energy 100% Plan 
Legislative confusion in the renewable energy sector puts several 
projects on hold 
Additional sulphur and nitrogen 
capture systems installed 
2014-… 
Environmental organizations predict 
„game over“ for oil shale industry 
after COP21 
UNFCCC members adopt Paris 
agreement on climate change at 
COP21 
Cost-competitiveness of  
renewable energy at global 
 all-time high 
Rise in environmental tax rates 
opposed by the Federation of 
Estonian Chemical Industries Economic: twofold 
drop in world crude oil 
price 
Environmental organizations 
„award“ the Federation of Estonian 
Chemical Industries and government 
two years in a row for damaging the 
environment 
The Basis of Climate Policy until 
2050 adopted 
Eesti Energia and VKG stop 
work at old oil factories and lay 
off several hundred employees 
New national development plan 
foresees 5,7 mln €  investments into 
oil  shale industry 
Eesti Energia and VKG re-hire 
employees after tax reductions 
and extra mining permits 
Socio-political: 
renewed presence of the 
climate change agenda Environmental tax rates on the oil 
shale industry temporarily reduced 
and extra free mining permits 
granted for oil shale industry 
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The situation changed markedly during the third period (2010-2013) when the temporary setback of 
the climate change agenda, combined with another rise in crude oil price, resulted in the dominance 
of immediate economic considerations. This led to an increased investment activity by the industry 
supported by regional and national-level policy-makers. The deviations from the model continued 
in the fourth period (2014-…) with the occurrence of another reversal of fortune, this time 
favouring the climate change agenda. Here the paradoxical behaviour of the policymakers became 
even more apparent: for example, both the Paris accord on climate change and a new oil shale 
development plan were agreed on during the very same week at the end of 2015, with the Prime 
Minister of Estonia publicly stating that the objectives of the two strategies were entirely 
compatible. In other words, the policymakers have pursued “hedging the bets” strategy throughout 
the whole observation period. 
Overall, we find empirical support for DILC as a dis-embedding mechanism but with an important 
qualification: when exogenous signals are ambiguous or contradictory (environmental vs. economic 
pressures) local responses (policymaking, industrial activities) will be similarly mixed, thereby 
distorting the ideal-typical progression of the model. 
Our findings also demonstrate the existence of different forms of embeddedness, operating on 
multiple scales (summarized in table 2). Furthermore, we find strong support for the claim that 
regional and national embeddedness serve as a stabilizing force for the industry. This is well 
evidenced by the fact that throughout the observation period the problem agendas of the industry 
and the policymakers were much more similar to each other than to the one advocated by activists 
and the same key points figured prominently in the arguments of both sides (see figure 6). The 
regional and national embeddedness of the industry enabled it to ignore certain issues (e.g. the 
multiple alternative energy plans by environmental organizations during the first two phases) and 
even expand production despite increasing contestation from activists (e.g. new plants and mines in 
the third phase). This process continued even in the context of increasing socio-political pressure ob 
international and national levels (e.g. the provision of favourable ad-hoc regulations by the 
government such as tax cuts to the industry-in-decline during the fourth phase). This is in line with 
Geels’s (2014b) suggestion that local policy-industry alliances (network embeddedness) are one of 
the key factors in shaping industry destabilization pressures. 
Table 2. Socio-spatial embeddedness of Estonian oil shale industry on different scales. 
Type of 
embeddedness 
Geographical scale 
Regional National International 
Territorial 
Location of oil shale fields and 
power plants and oil factories in 
Ida-Virumaa 
    
Local technological 
specialization and industry 
 lock-in 
    
Societal 
Cultural meaning of oil shale as  
1) national wealth enabling international technology export, 
 2) guarantee of energy security and independence,  
3) vital "backbone" of the local economy to avoid social 
catastrophe in Ida-Virumaa 
  
Network 
Defensive reaction by the mayor 
of Kiviõli for the local chemical 
plant against the national 
government after plans of 
limiting mining permits or 
Strategic investments of state-
owned Eesti Energia controlled by 
Minister of Economics 
Position of the industry in global 
value chains and production 
networks makes it sensitive to 
the fluctuations of the world 
crude oil price 
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increasing taxes (2003, 2007, 
2011) 
Reactive policy support for firms-
in-industry due to economic 
downfalls and industry lobbying 
(2009, 2014-2015) 
National climate and energy 
policies strongly influenced by 
multi-level governance (EU and 
UN) 
 
An important implication of our multi-scalar analysis is that environmental pressures do not 
translate automatically into local responses as the disembedding and (re-)embedding mechanisms 
might cancel each other out in a specific locality. This, in turn, leads to a misalignment of scales 
where the presence of international pressures is not fully matched by local responses. In the case at 
hand, the anticipated regional and national spill-over effects of global destabilization often overrode 
broader concerns for sustainability. For example, the historical legacy of the Narva crisis has 
conditioned the sensitivity of policy-makers towards the issue of regional unemployment. This 
became especially manifest in the fourth phase where Eesti Energia and VKG initially laid off 
several hundred employees yet immediately started rehiring once the policy-makers had temporarily 
alleviated environmental taxes and granted new mining permits. The need for policy-makers to find 
a balance between regional, national and international pressures has resulted in a situation in which 
the international climate change agenda shows a long-term trend towards increased visibility yet the 
Estonian oil shale industry, capitalizing on its regional and national embeddedness, has remained 
relatively durable. Another way to put this is to say that national and regional scales have largely 
managed to “filter out” the destabilizing impact of international pressures. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
This study combined the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle model and the geography of transitions literature. 
Based on the study of the Estonian oil shale industry between 1995-2016 it explored the following 
research questions: 1) what are the main forms of socio-spatial embeddedness of industries on 
different geographical scales? 2) how do global pressures interact with local embeddedness and 
what is the result of this interaction for industry destabilization? The main findings were as follows: 
1. Actors in a given locality are simultaneously embedded on multiple scales and in different 
ways with territorial embeddedness operating on the regional scale, societal embeddedness 
extending to the national scale and network embeddedness being present on all three scales; 
2. The DILC model performs fairly well in describing the increasing pressure by activists and 
consumers but fails to capture the activities of policy-makers and industry incumbents 
which lag more than expected. Moreover, the policymakers were employing a “hedging the 
bets” strategy throughout the observation period, addressing both the climate change issue 
as well as investing into oil shale. This contradicts the DILC model which expects the 
policy-makers to exert increasing pressure on the industry regime; 
3. The realization of the DILC model as a disembedding mechanism depends on the balance 
between socio-political and economic environmental pressures. The process proceeds slowly 
towards destabilization in the presence of both pressures but intensifies in either direction 
when one of the pressures gains an upper hand; 
4. National and regional embeddedness, especially the policy-industry interlock based on 
mutual societal background and territorial ties, serves as a powerful mechanism of industry 
(re-)stabilization enabling the incumbents to ignore challenges early on, increase activities 
during favourable economic conditions and ask for policy support during very difficult 
times; 
5. Hence in contrast to what the DILC model implies, there is no straightforward transmission 
of international pressures on local industries as the socio-spatial embeddedness of industries 
on national and regional scales can largely “filter out” the destabilizing impact of 
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international pressures. This leads to a misalignment of scales where the existence of 
pressures on international scale is not necessarily matched by local responses. 
Our findings have three broader implications for transitions studies. First, existing literature on 
industry regimes and transitions has largely focused on the role of environmental pressures in 
destabilizing the industry or an incumbent socio-technical regime. Our findings suggest that this 
view is incomplete: in order for industrial transformation (or transition) to occur the industry (or the 
socio-technical regime) also needs to be disembedded from its spatial context. Policy measures 
should thus target the territorial, societal and network embeddedness of industries and regimes. In 
the Estonian context activists have attempted to turn attention to the suitability of the North-Eastern 
industrial region for wind energy (territorial embeddedness) and to reinterpret the meaning of 
energy security, connecting it to dispersed energy production based on renewables (societal 
embeddedness); recent policy battles whether politicians should continue to be members of the 
boards of state-owned enterprises (such as Eesti Energia) can be seen as attempts to address the 
policy-industry interlock (network embeddedness). These examples show that local actors are 
constantly trying to reshape the territorial, societal and network ties between the industry and its 
environment. 
Second, the study suggests that the design of “policy mixes” to facilitate transitions should go 
beyond the coupling of niche stimulation with regime destabilization (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; 
Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). An important but overlooked dimension concerns addressing the spill-
over effects of regime destabilization, reflected in the prevalence of concerns about energy security 
and regional unemployment issues in the Estonian case throughout the whole observation period. 
We suggest that attending to these issues, resulting from the socio-spatial embeddedness of 
industries, might necessitate a gradual phase-out strategy rather than the “shock therapy” of 
technological substitution (Geels and Schot, 2007) as the former enables a proactive management of 
the spill-over effects of regime destabilization. 
Lastly, and in conjunction with the second point, the various ways that industries are embedded on 
regional, national and international levels and the resulting mismatch of scales indicates that 
different policy mixes are needed on different scales. Although it is easy for policymakers and 
incumbent industries to see the obstacles for implementing internationally agreed-upon policies on 
the regional level, we encourage them to pay more attention to the possibilities for regional 
reorientation (Boschma, 2017; Boschma et al., 2017; Steen and Weaver, 2017) and path renewal 
(Coenen et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2017; Steen, 2016) based on the specific regional energy 
contexts (Lutz et al., 2017) and on the technical knowledge and capabilities of local actors (Hansen 
and Coenen, 2017). 
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Appendix A. Coding manual for the content analysis of newspaper articles. 
1. Overall parameters of the text 
A0 Number 
A1 Date 
A2 Publisher 
A3 Headline 
A4 Whose views are mainly represented in the article? 
1 Journalist 
2 Environmental activist 
3 Politician or government official 
4 Industry representative 
5 Renewable energy entrepreneur 
6 Scientist 
7 Other 
 
2. Manifestations of evidence on industry destabilization 
B1 Activism and issue framing 
1 Climate change is mentioned as an issue 
2 An organization or movement concerned with climate change is mentioned 
3 Public opinion towards climate change is mentioned 
4 New climate policies are advocated 
5 Other 
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6 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B2 Politics and policy 
1 The creation of an informal committee concerned with climate change is mentioned 
2 Formal hearings in the parliament about climate change are mentioned  
3 New climate policies are mentioned 
4 Changes in economic frame conditions are mentioned 
5 Other 
6 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B3 Supply and demand 
 1 Rising renewable energy demand is mentioned 
2 A renewable energy market niche is mentioned 
 3 Changes in mainstream preferences of energy use are mentioned 
4 Other 
5 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B4 Industry strategies 
 1 Climate change is denied 
2 The seriousness of climate change is downplayed 
 3 A closed industry front is mentioned 
4 The claims of climate activists are contested 
5 An incremental technological solution by a firm in the oil shale industry is mentioned 
6 Renewable energy technologies are portrayed as unfeasible 
7 Investment into renewable energy by a firm in the oil shale industry is mentioned 
8 New climate policies are opposed 
9 Diversification by a firm in the oil shale industry into new product markets is mentioned 
10 Substantial technological or regulative changes by a firm in the oil shale industry are mentioned 
11 Substantial changes in the mission or identity of a firm in the oil shale industry are mentioned 
12 The bankruptcy of a firm in the oil shale industry is mentioned 
 13 Other 
14 None of the above are mentioned 
 
3. Manifestations of evidence on socio-spatial embeddedness 
C1 Alternative issue framings 
 1 Energy security 
2 Employment 
3 Low oil price 
4 Tax revenue from the oil shale industry 
5 Oil shale as the national wealth 
6 Environmental damage (other than climate change) 
7 Hidden subsidies for the oil shale industry 
8 Decreasing oil shale reserves 
9 Inefficiency of oil shale as an energy source 
10 Natural habitats of the flying squirrel 
 
C2 Alternative energy policies proposed and /or implemented 
 1 Decentralisation of energy production 
2 Limiting the oil shale mining capacity 
3 Renewable energy subsidies 
4 Privatisation of energy companies 
5 Temporary status for oil shale industry by the EU 
6 Temporary reduction of environmental taxes for the oil shale industry 
7 Taxing based on the world crude oil price 
 
C3 Alternative energy sources proposed 
1 Nuclear 
2 Wind 
3 Solar 
4 Woodchips 
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5 Other biofuels (including waste) 
6 Renewable energy sources in general 
 7 All alternatives depicted as infeasible 
 
C4 Alternative industry strategies 
 1 Opening a new oil shale mine 
 2 Establishing a new power plant 
3 Establishing a new oil factory 
4 Cutting costs by laying off employees 
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